This week marks the one-year anniversary of the end of the
2006 Lebanon War. In strictly numerical terms, it was a tiny
conflict. Fewer than 2,000 people died, a tiny fraction of the
number killed in Iraq and Afghanistan. Nor did the war result
in any territory changing hands, or the regional balance of
power shifting permanently in a significant way. But the
battle will nonetheless be remembered as an important
milestone in the Long War between the West and militant Islam.
While the Taliban and al-Qaeda are alienating their would-be
followers with nihilistic violence, Hezbollah has developed a
far more complex strategy that combines terrorism with
sophisticated guerilla warfare, state-of-the-art weaponry,
savvy public relations, charismatic leadership and state
sponsorship. In fact, the group’s surprisingly strong effort a
year ago highlighted at least a half-dozen important
innovations in Islamist war-making:
Public relations. Al-Qaeda and the
Taliban are shadowy organizations that occasionally emit
videos full of rambling apocalyptic speechifying. Hezbollah,
on the other hand, operates a full-function satellite
channel, Al-Manar Television, that the Israeli air force was
never able to put out of commission. Throughout the 2006
Lebanon War, Hezbollah’s charismatic chairman, Hassan
Nasrallah, kept up his media profile from undisclosed
locations. When Israeli bombs went astray and killed
civilians — as they did, most tragically, in the town of
Qana on July 30 — Hezbollah media handlers quickly descended
on the scene to manage the way the story was reported. Thus
was Hezbollah — which had started the war by kidnapping two
Israeli soldiers — able to turn world opinion against Israel
by the end of the conflict.
Massive state sponsorship. Since its
creation in the early 1980s, Hezbollah has been armed,
trained and financed by Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guards
Corps (IRGC). Even during the war itself, IRGC officers
assisted Hezbollah, and ensured that supply routes through
Syria remained open for the group’s fighters. At the United
Nations, Iran exerted pressures on its veto-wielding trade
partners, China and Russia, to water down any action against
Hezbollah. Damascus and Tehran also constrained Israel’s
strategy by threatening to bring the Jewish state into a
wider regional war.
Missiles. Hezbollah’s use of thousands
of Iranian-supplied missiles to bombard northern Israel
during the 2006 Lebanon War represented an unprecedented
tactic: Until this time, no guerrilla force had made use of
such long-range weapons in waging a sustained campaign
against enemy population centers. While the missiles had
little military effect, they had enormous psychological
impact, sending hundreds of thousands of Israelis fleeing
southward.
Battlefield weaponry. Iran supplied
Hezbollah with not only missiles, but state-of-the-art
tactical weapons. Especially effective were guided,
shoulder-fired anti-tank weapons, which Hezbollah ambush
crews used to attack Israeli vehicles and troop
concentrations. Hezbollah fighters were also equipped with
modern night-vision equipment, erasing the night-time
advantage that Western armies have come to take for granted.
The creation of a wholesale terrorist mini-state
in southern Lebanon. This innovation permitted
Hezbollah fighters to act entirely unconstrained by
Lebanon’s army and government. It also complicated Israel’s
response by turning the conflict into a three-way affair, in
which Lebanon itself was cast as an innocent bystander being
made to suffer for Hezbollah’s actions. By separating its
jihadi cause from any particular sovereign, geographical
entity, Hezbollah enjoyed the benefit of territorial control
without the obligations and vulnerabilities that go with
governance.
Cleverly concocted righteous fury.
Hezbollah has always styled itself as a Lebanese
“resistance” group.” When Israel evacuated its forces from
Lebanon in 2000, this raison d’être was eliminated. But
Hezbollah managed to keep its “resistance” campaign alive by
insisting that the uninhabited Israeli-controlled Shebaa
Farms border region is actually Lebanese territory. Unlike
Islamist fanatics in other countries, moreover, Hezbollah
has paid proper attention to domestic Muslim politics. From
the beginning, the group has presented itself as the
champion of Lebanon’s long-suffering Shiites. In the
aftermath of last year’s war, Hezbollah turned the local
destruction to its own advantage by funnelling Iranian cash
into distressed Shiite areas.
Terrorists may be evil, but they aren’t stupid. As the
migration of suicide bombers from Iraq to Afghanistan shows,
they copy what works. And so in coming years, we should expect
to see terrorists trying to import these Hezbollah innovations
to Pakistan, the horn of Africa, Kashmir, Gaza, the West Bank
and other parts of the Muslim world. As tiny as the 2006
Lebanon War was, it may have a gigantic impact on the defining
struggle of our times.
jkay@nationalpost.com
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