Unless and until terrorists acquire nuclear weapons,
blowing up airplanes will be their most effective strategy for
creating mass casualties. Timothy McVeigh needed about two
tonnes of explosives to kill 168 people. By leveraging the
deadly power of gravity, a terrorist who attacks a commercial
airliner can kill the same number with a charge one thousandth
the size.
In response to the threat, governments have taken measures
to prevent suicide terrorists from sneaking on board airplanes
with bombs and knives. But that's just one way to bring down a
plane. As usual, the West is building a Maginot defence
against yesterday's terror attacks, but ignoring
tomorrow's.
In May, a Saudi security patrol found a tube from an SA-7
shoulder-mounted missile-launcher -- a Russian version of the
heat-seeking U.S.-supplied Stingers the Afghan mujahedeen used
to shoot down more than 200 Soviet aircraft in the 1980s --
near the U.S. Air Force's Prince Sultan base. A May 22 FBI
intelligence bulletin concluded "the discovery is likely
related to al-Qaeda targeting efforts against U.S.-led forces
on the Arabian peninsula." Nine days later, The Washington
Times reported that Stinger-armed Islamic terrorists may
already be on U.S. soil.
I have no special insight as to whether these reports are
accurate. But it would surprise me if they weren't. There are
thousands of Stinger-type missiles in worldwide circulation,
and the black-market price is reportedly in the mid-five
figures.
Although the number of deaths from a Stinger strike would
be low by the standards set by the World Trade Center
disaster, the psychological effect would be devastating. After
Sept. 11, our leaders convinced us they could keep us safe by
beefing up airport security. And we believed them. But such
self-deception would not survive a missile attack: All the
bomb-sniffing dogs and racial profiling in the world won't
stop a Stinger. Since the tiny missiles can hit targets up to
10,000 feet up in the air (13,000 feet in the case of the
Russian version), an al-Qaeda Stinger team wouldn't even have
to come near an airport. An abandoned industrial park a few
miles away would do fine.
You might think we're powerless against such a threat. But,
thanks to the much-reviled American military-industrial
complex, we're not. Northrop Grumman is now in limited
production of a plane-mounted anti-missile system that, in
live-fire tests, has blocked a variety of infrared-guided
missile types with virtually 100% reliability.
Competing systems typically rely on flare decoys, which
distract heat-guided missiles but also pose a fire hazard to
nearby buildings. But the new system operates on an entirely
different principle. It works like this: When a Stinger is
launched, the heat signature of its plume is detected by a
plane-mounted sensor. An infrared emitter housed in a small
turret mounted on the hull then automatically directs a stream
of radiation at the missile, blinding its guidance system and
sending it off course. The whole package weighs about 260 kg
and takes up about as much space as a few large suitcases.
Northrop Grumman has already sold its system -- code-named
Nemesis -- to the U.S. military, which means that in the next
war, U.S. planes may be able to safely fly missions at
whatever altitude they choose. By installing the Nemesis on
passenger airliners, we could safeguard domestic skies against
Stingers too. But according to Northrop Grumman, not a single
commercial airline has committed to the system. Nor is there
any interest in Washington. Congress' Electronic Warfare
Working Group has promoted the Nemesis in recent years, but
only for combat applications.
Are economic factors holding the technology back? I doubt
it. Sources at Northrop Grumman told me that installing
Nemesis on a single plane would cost about US$5-million. But
according to Philip J. Klass, who has written about the
Nemesis system for Aviation Week & Space Technology, that
figure would apply only to a one-off job. Outfitting a
substantial fleet with the Nemesis system, he estimates, would
cost only about $2-million to $3-million per plane -- or about
2% of the cost of a Boeing 747-400. The airlines already spend
similar sums outfitting their cabins with personal Nintendo,
phone and movie systems.
My guess is that no one will make a serious push to put
Nemesis on commercial airliners until a plane does get shot
down. (Some say that one already has been: TWA Flight 800,
which crashed off Long Island in 1996. But that's a minority
view.) That fits in with the traditional pattern: On the
terrorism file, the West's game over the past two decades has
been strictly reactive. In fact, the polite-but-uninterested
response I got when I interviewed Electronic Warfare Working
Group staff earlier this week was roughly what I would have
heard if I'd called the FAA on Sept. 10 asking about cockpit
security.
Remember that no one thought much about protecting U.S.
military installations overseas until a truck loaded with
explosives blew up a building full of sleeping Marines in
1983. Ditto the security situation at U.S. embassies until the
1998 bombings. Sept. 11 was supposed to mark the beginning of
a "war" against -- terrorism. Yet the old peace-time pattern
remains: We give the terrorists one free hit before we start
defending ourselves in any serious way.